Tag: self interest

Are we selfish b*stards driven by our own self interest?

Self interest as a human nature driver for happiness?

The drive of self-interest for material well-being has been seen to be a fundamental aspect of human nature, particularly since the Enlightenment (Persky 1995) as seen in the works of Adam Smith (1776) and John Stuart Mill (1836). Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan placed self interest on the throne of human motivation.

Yet, self interest has not been seen as the only drive for humanity. Alongside this drive is the ‘Will to Power’ associated with Friedrich Nietzsche, the ‘Pleasure Principle’ associated with Epicurus, Jeremy Bentham and with Sigmund Freud (Snyder, Lopez and Pedrotti 2007) and the ‘Will to Meaning’ associated with Frankl (1946/2006). Thus the quests for Power, Pleasure and Meaning are alternatives to economic self interest as drivers for human action. Erich Fromm and Manfred Max Neef have also discussed fundamental human needs which could be thought of as drivers for human action. Self interest for material gain does not feature anywhere near as prominent.

Miller (1999) argues that a different view of human agency acknowledges the power of other motives, such as public spiritedness ( Etzioni, 1988 ; Mansbridge, 1994 ), empathy (Batson, 1991 ; Kohn, 1990 ), commitment ( Sen, 1977 ), and justice ( Lerner, 1980 ; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997 ).

Yet given this, somewhat admittedly white, colonialist and patriarchal divergence of views on what motivates us in contemporary societies, it could be argued that hegemonic neoliberal imaginary (Hall 2011) especially in the United States and the United kingdom since the 1970’s, rests on the idea of the rational actor, the ‘free, possessive, individual’, using his economic self interest for ‘life liberty and the pursuit of happiness’. This is a concept understood in classical economics as ‘homo economicus’ – the rational actor in a market weighing up costs and benefits of consuming decisions according to price signals.  Neoliberalism may draw upon neoclassical economic theory and may draw upon theories of human behavior which suggest we are more motivated by rational action for self interest. It has also been used to justify the current economic order and also as an explanation for inequalities. Self Interest as expressed through ‘free’ markets is therefore not only an explanation but also a guiding imperative for policy or ‘ideology’. Adam Smith has particularly been appropriated to the cause alongside the later economists, Hayek and Friedman.

One aspect of rational self interest is that of “principal-agent” theory: agents will perform best under high-powered financial incentives to align their interests with those of the principal (a business school thesis – Layard 2009). For example employees and managers (agents) will work for the same goals of employers and shareholders (principals) and not in their own self interest, if the goals are aligned, e.g. profits are shared. However, Daniel Pink argues that above a certain level of material reward, what motivates us is Mastery, Autonomy and Purpose. Financial rewards start to become hindrances rather than benefits. Not that this insight affects the level of, and justification for, the ‘High Pay‘ of many ‘fat cat’ CEOs.

John Stuart Mill (1836) argued:

[Political economy] does not treat the whole of man’s nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end.

Similarly, Adam Smith (1776) wrote:

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.

Smith (1759) however does express in ‘The Theory of Moral Sentiments’ that self interest alone is not the sole motivator, men can act out of regard for others:

“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrows of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous or the humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it” .

This exposition of rational self interest demonstrates that Smith accepted that what makes us human is not only based on unrestrained self interest.

This is a point picked up by Becker (2007) who argues that moral leadership is exercised not solely based on rational self interest, that business decisions are not made only on the economic conditions of the market. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) is also an example of business principles being enunciated which go beyond the simple search for maximum profit.

However, the theory of self interest allied to material reward remains strong as a description of ‘natural’ human behaviour. If it is ‘natural’ then human happiness is gained if self interest is given its head. Self interest as ‘human nature’ can be seen therefore as the major drive which should be harnessed both for prosperity and happiness. Graham Scambler, following on from Margaret Archer’s theory of ‘modes of reflexivity’, argues that we have entered an era where plutocrats and oligarchs have captured the levers of the State to rule as ‘Greedy Bastards’.

He constructed an ideal-typical sub-type of Archer’s ‘autonomous reflexive’ called the focused autonomous reflexive. Those who make up the ruling oligarchy, or the ‘greedy bastards’, are also ‘focused autonomous reflexives’. Scambler argues they have the following characteristics:

“TOTAL COMMITMENT:  The focused autonomous reflexive exhibits an overriding engagement with accumulating capital and personal wealth/income. Nothing less will suffice: that is, any deficit in commitment will result in absolute or relative failure. NIETZSCHIAN INSTINCT: Born of a Hobbesian notion of the natural human state, they betray a ruthless determination to cut whatever corners are necessary to gain an advantage over rivals. they are the ‘blond beasts’ of ‘noble morality’ whose values are constructed by themselves to serve their own interests. FUNDAMENTALIST IDEOLOGY: Commitment is not only total and Nietzschian but fundamentalist: it does not admit of compromise. It is an ideology – that is, a standpoint emerging from a coherent set of vested interests – that brooks no alternative. COGNITIVE INSURANCE: While cognitive dissonance is a state to which none of us is immune, they are  able to take out sufficient insurance to draw its sting. Thus accusations of greed and responsibility for others’ suffering are rarely internalized. Such epistemological and ontological security is the exception rather than the rule in this era of financial capitalism. TUNNEL VISION: A concomitant of a total, Nietzschian and fundamentalist commitment is the sidelining of other matters and a reflex and frequently gendered delegation of these to others. LIFEWORLD DETACHMENT: There is simply no time for the ordinary business of day-to-day decision-making. In this way focused autonomous reflexives rely on and reproduce structures not only of gender but of class, ethnicity, ageing and so on. Their Lifeworld detachment presupposes others’ non-detachment, i.e. other people service the every day requirements of life”. 

Graham Scambler’s typology requires empirical verification and is not meant to describe any one person in totality. Without studying the lives of the 0.01% and their ‘players’ (often to be found in the 1%), this cannot be verified. However, may we see indicators of their world views in their speeches and writings?

Societies have ‘myths’ – stories to explain phenomena and to bind the people together. Self Interest in free markets is an old story, an ‘anti-myth’, as it divides peoples based on negativity, rather than binds. It sorts a people into ‘winners and losers’, ‘top cornflakes‘, ‘skivers or strivers‘ and the ‘left behind‘. It is not based in the actuality of human experience or within philosophy over history, but has been imposed in the West as a guiding ideology especially since the Reagan-Thatcher Duopoly. The Autonomous Reflexives both in the political class and the corporate class of the 0.01%, have imposed  “there is no alternative” and ridden roughshod over other values and stories. Facts, evidence and reason have not worked against their neoliberalism to date. However we may be witnessing the challenge of Authoritarian Populism, which will either destroy or appropriate neoliberalism, as a new ‘anti-myth’. What we need now is a new story, to bridge this ‘myth gap’ (Evans 2017).

 

 

 

 

 

Becker, G. (2007) The Competitive edge of Moral leadership. International Management Review Vol 3 No. 1

Evans A (2017) The Myth Gap. What happens when evidence and reason aren’t enough. Eden Project Books.

Frankl V (2006) orig. 1946. Man’s search for meaning. Beacon Press. Boston.

Hall S (2011) THE NEO-LIBERAL REVOLUTION, Cultural Studies, 25:6, 705-728

Mill, J.S. (1836) On the Definition of Political Economy, and on the Method of Investigation Proper to It, London and Westminster Review, October.

Miller D (1999) The Norm of Self Interest. American Psychologist 54:12: 1053-1-6-

Layard, R (2009) Now is the time for a less selfish capitalism FT.com 11 March http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3f6e2d5c-0e76-11de-b099-0000779fd2ac.html#ixzz1AcXchHYm

Persky, J. (1995) Retrospectives: The Ethology of Homo Economicus. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 2. pp. 221-231

Snyder C, Lopez S and Pedrotti J (2007) Positive Psychology: The scientific and Practical Explorations of Human Strengths. Sage. London

Smith, A. (1759) Theory of Moral Sentiments. http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMSCover.html  accessed 9th January 2011

Smith, A. (1776) On the Division of Labour. The Wealth of Nations, Books I-III. New York Penguin Classics, 1986, page 119.

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